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Modern day digital economy poses challenges for taxation system based on traditional 
rules of physical presence and transfer pricing rules. Prolonged multilateral efforts are yet 
to come out with a final globally acceptable solution. Consequently, many countries have 
begun taking unilateral measures to tax their digital economy. These steps violate the 
accepted norms of international taxation. The latest decision by France in the form of 
Digital Service Tax goes a step further in being tailor made to target US based digital 
companies while excluding the French companies from the tax net. This paper explores 
the existing position and the available options for a response by US side and recommends 
taxation of French companies at double the prevalent rate as the preferred option. For this 
purposes, the paper recommends issuance of an executive order by the President of the 
Untied States in exercise of the power vested in him by Section 891 of the Tax code 26. 
The papers claims that this would provide a sufficiently strong reply to France action 
with immediate impact and also recoup the revenue losses to the US government. The 
paper also explains how it would be a good deterrence for other countries that are in the 
process of introducing similar legislations. 
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To:  THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
From:  NEELAM SHUKLA 
Subject: Introduction of Digital Service Tax by France 
Date:  April 26,2020 
 
Action Forcing Event 
On 2nd December 2019, the United States Trade Representatives issued its report on 
France Digital Service Tax, prepared in pursuant to an investigation under section 301 
of Trade Act of 19741. This investigation was in response to the levy of a digital 
service tax of 3% by the French government on revenue from digital services earned 
in France by multinational enterprises. This tax was applied from retrospective effect 
(from 1st January 2019), though the President of France finally signed the bill on July 
2019. French officials and ministers often referred to it as “GAFA Tax” (Google, 
Apple, Facebook, Amazon Tax), which explicitly indicates that this tax is targeted 
mainly towards US based companies2.   
 
Statement of Problem 
The Digital Service Tax (DST) introduced by France, will not only impose a 
burden on US companies but will also erode the tax base of United States. DST being 
a gross revenue tax is not only a bad tax policy but also a threat to the international 
tax system. It violates the core canons of the international tax system that taxes should 
be imposed on income rather than revenues and that states have the right to tax their 
residents. 
                                                        








The DST is a substantively new tax that will require new reporting and 
accounting systems to implement. It will have significant bearing on companies’ tax 
reporting and recordkeeping responsibilities, as well as their overall tax liability. The 
DST makes these changes effective immediately upon the law’s publication and 
retroactively for the seven months preceding its announcement. This contravenes the 
principle of tax certainty, as well as specific OECD guidelines. The levy of a tax with 
retrospective effect is not only against the ‘Principle of certainty” of taxation 
(particularly in the international tax arena) but is unprecedented and extremely 
burdensome for the companies. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce said that the tax 
would generate revenue of approximately 500 million euros ($554 million) per year, 
the majority of which will be paid by U. S. firms3. It will also cost U.S. firms millions 
of dollars to conduct ‘significant re-engineering of accounting system to ensure that 
they can accurately assess liability. 
The existing framework under ‘Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement’ 
(DTAA) between US and France does not provide for these taxes to be eligible for 
credit against taxes due in US4, This would therefore increase the total taxes paid by 
U.S. multinational companies in jurisdictions around the world, and impose excess 
financial burden on these companies. Any effort to allow credit would effectively 
force the U.S. Treasury (and U.S. taxpayers) to subsidize tax rates imposed by foreign 
jurisdictions. Neither of the scenarios is in the fiscal interests of the nation. 
The statement in 2018 by the French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire at an 
informal meeting that  "We want to tax American tech giants, but certainly we don’t 
                                                        









want the Chinese to tax Louis Vuitton" betrays the true reason behind this DST5. It is 
anything but an effort for fair taxation. It is an effort to garner extra revenue from US 
companies while sparing their own companies and economies. This dual standard is at 
the core of the problem. 
This has started a trend amongst countries to take up unilateral measures in the 
name of addressing the tax challenges of digitalization of economy. 35 countries are 
known to be in various stages of implementing different versions of digital service 
tax6. If left unchecked they would only go on to unduly exacerbate the tax troubles for 




France and other countries like Austria, Hungary, Italy, United Kingdom etc. 
seek to levy taxes on revenue earned by multinational corporations (MNCs) in certain 
“digital economy” sectors from activities linked to the user-based activity of their 
residents7. These proposals have generally been labeled as “digital services taxes” 
(DSTs). It is a reflexive, unilateral step by certain countries to the realization that the 
existing rules fail to capture their right share of taxes from the digital economy. The 
run up to DST starts with the challenges caused by the emergence of the digital 
economy, along with the multilateral and unilateral efforts that have developed in 
response. 
                                                        
5 Hellmann Andreas, American Tax Reforms, November 15th, 2018 
 




7 Report of Congressional Research Service titled- Digital Services Taxes (DSTs): Policy and 




The digital economy, by creating new business models that challenge the 
traditional concept of physical proximity to target markets, also challenges the 
traditional rules of taxation and leads to conflicts on allocation of taxing rights to 
various stakeholders. They have allowed shifting of profits and avoidance of taxes by 
multi-national enterprises. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) identifies three important phenomena facilitated by 
digitalization – scale without mass, reliance on intangible assets, and the centrality of 
data – to be posing serious challenges to elements of the foundations of the global tax 
system8 
The fact that digitalization posed challenges to the global tax system was felt 
by the world community as early as the 1998 Ottawa Conference of Finance 
Ministers9. The OECD pursued this work, getting the endorsement of the G-20 in 
2013 for its action plan to tackle the challenges to the taxation of the digital 
economy10. This culminated in OECD submitting its detailed Action Plan on Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting on 19th July 201311. It is no coincidence that the first 
action plan proposed in the report was that to address the tax challenges of the digital 
economy.  The action plan brought to the fore several options that were being 
considered as possible solutions. It deliberated on extending the nexus rules to include 
SEP (significant economic presence) concept with an option like the modified deemed 
                                                        
8 Note by OECD in its report titled- Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation available at 
https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-actions/action1/ 
 





10 Communiqué-G20 Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors  
Moscow, July 20, 2013: http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2013/2013-0720-finance.html 
 







profits method to allocate profits12. The action plan also examined  ‘Withholding tax’ 
(a standalone gross basis final withholding on payments made to non-resident 
providers of goods and services online as a possible option along with the 
equalization levy. However, it did not zero in on any one proposal in view of the 
much work that needed to go in before reaching such conclusion. The French DST is 
a version of this withholding tax. 
Following a mandate by G-20 Finance Ministers in March 201713, the 
Inclusive Framework on BEPS, an intergovernmental working group of OECD, 
through its Task Force on the Digital Economy (TFDE), has been working to bring 
about a consensus-based solution to these challenges14. As on date, the OECD has 
come out with public consultation documents to address these problems broadly under 
two pillars that deal with ‘Allocation of taxing rights’ and ‘other BEPS issues’ 
respectively. It is expected that the Global Community will come out with a workable 
solution by the end of Year 2020 and such solution would be accepted for adoption by 
all member countries15. Negotiations are under progress. 
  However, the steps being taken were felt insufficient to address the concerns 
that emerge out of digitalization of economy fully and timely. Several of the countries 
have therefore been actively exploring the option of a unilateral fix to this problem. 
While efforts have not been limited to European countries, efforts to develop policy 
                                                        





13 Communiqué-G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors 
March 18, 2017, Baden: http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2017/170318-finance-en.html 
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principles and justifications in support of these specific taxes on digital economy 
markets have primarily been driven by politicians and commentators in Europe, 
including the United Kingdom16. The various proposals in Europe to tax the digital 
economy share many of the features of digital taxation options discussed in the OECD 
BEPS report.  
In March 2018, the European Commission announced a digital tax package 
containing two proposals. The first proposal would expand the definition of 
permanent establishment to include cases where a company had significant economic 
activity through a “digital presence,” thereby allowing European Union (EU) 
members to tax profits that are generated in their jurisdiction even if a firm does not 
have a physical presence. The second was to be an “interim tax” on certain revenue 
from digital activities: selling online advertising, online marketplaces (facilitating the 
buying and selling of goods and services between users), and sales of data generated 
from user-provided information. The second was to be in levied till the first proposal 
is fully in place17. Media reports indicate that the EU-wide proposals had stalled 
partly due to disagreement among member states with different economic interests 
and questions as to whether the proposals would be legal under EU law18. 
France had been active in leading this initiative at EU level. However, as French 
officials realized that this was not going to pass through European Union, they moved 
on to unilaterally enact their own DST19. The grounds put forward is that it addresses 
                                                        
16 Report of Congressional Research Service titled- Digital Services Taxes (DSTs): Policy and 
Economic Analysis- available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45532.pdf 
 
17 Proposal for a ‘Council Directive’ on the common system of a digital services tax on revenues 
resulting from the provision of certain digital services available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=COM:2018:148:FIN 
 
18 Report of Congressional Research Service titled- Digital Services Taxes (DSTs): Policy and 
Economic Analysis- available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45532.pdf 
 





the alleged under-taxation of digital companies until the negotiations in the OECD 
can produce a multilateral agreement on the international tax system. The whole 
process, from release of proposal to the passage of law by both houses of French 
Parliament has been very swift with little time for debate or understanding of its true 
intent or implications. The bill was submitted for consideration the French Parliament 
on March 06th 2019 and was signed into a law on July 24th 201920.  
It is ironic that the OECD, based in Paris, is working for a multilateral consensus 
based solution that is fair and appropriate to taxpayers and jurisdictions while France 
moved to undermine this effort by putting in place a unilateral DST. As per a 
chronology of efforts documented by the USTR in its 301 report, US officials have 
made repeated attempts to explain and convince the French authorities from enacting 
the DST and to work with others and US for a multilateral solution. Various officials 
from US embassy in Paris, US Treasury, State department met many French officials 
on multiple occasions to explain and encourage them to desist from resorting to such 
step21. 
None of these efforts were of any avail. Though the French Officials stated that it 
would be a transient tax and would be repealed after the OECD reaches a solution, 
they failed to incorporate provisions to this effect in the bill that has since been made 
a law22. 
                                                        
20 France: Digital services tax (3%) is enacted: https://home.kpmg/us/en/home/insights/2019/07/tnf-
france-digital-services-tax-enacted.html 
 
21 Report on France’s Digital Services Tax Prepared in the Investigation under Section 301 of the Trade 
Act of 1974 






It is pertinent to note that pursuant to the French move, several European countries 
have announced, proposed, or implemented a digital services tax (DST).23 
Policy proposal 
 
The goal of this policy proposal is to provide a mechanism that recoups the extra 
expenditure to the US companies and thus the US Treasury. The proposal also aims to 
provide a reason for France to withdraw its DST while simultaneously providing 
deterrence for other countries like Austria and UK to not proceed with their proposals 
of taxation of digital economy focused on US companies. 
This 1934 provision of the U.S. tax code (Section 103 of the 1934 Act) titled 
‘Doubling of rates of tax on citizens and corporations of certain foreign countries’ 
makes it mandatory for the President, upon a finding that U.S. companies or citizens 
are being subject to discriminatory taxes, to make a proclamation to that effect and 
double the rates of tax imposed by sections 1, 3, 11, 801, 831, 852, 871, and 881 of 
the tax code in the case of each citizen and corporation of such foreign country. The 
law provides that the proclamation is to be effective until a finding of discriminatory 
taxes being withdrawn by that erring country is made. This tax however has a cap of 
80% of the taxable income of the taxpayer before deductions24. 
This provision may be invoked to mandate a tax on the global revenues of the 
large firms with taxable presence in United States but incorporated in countries like 
France that seek to tax the digital income of the US companies. In light of the express 
mandate available through this section, it is proposed that the President issue an 
Executive Order for the levy of tax at double the prevailing rates in case of such 
                                                        
23 Article by Tax Foundation titled-Digital Services Taxes in Europe available at  
https://taxfoundation.org/digital-tax-europe-2020/  
 





foreign countries. The order should mention France and also provide for automatic 
application to all countries in case of which the proclamation of finding of 
discriminatory tax treatment of US citizens and corporations is made by the President. 
As the French DST envisages a levy of taxes in case of US digital companies only, 
the scope of the executive order may be restricted to French companies. The IRS 
under the Department of treasury may be entrusted with the responsibility of the 
administration of such executive order.  
The tax rates could be a mirror image of the taxes the respective countries seek to 
impose on US companies. The thresholds to be set for taxation could also correspond 
those set by the respective countries. The proclamation is to be effective in and from 
the tax year in which it is made and for all such tax year when the proclamation lasts. 
The sunset period of such taxes could be either of two dates of events: acceptance of 
the global consensus solution by the respective countries and complete 
implementation of the consensus solution in the domestic economy as also applicable 
to the US companies operating in such economies or repeal of the unilateral DST. 
Necessary protection carve-outs to continue the tax if the DST continues to apply in 
the respective countries in any other form may need to be included as well. 
This order would affect about 4,800 French subsidiaries in the U.S25.  As these 
foreign corporations are required to file their tax returns in Form-1120 F, appropriate 
changes in tax rates need to be made in relevant columns in the form and the 
instructions for filling the form that has to be issued for the relevant tax years. As tax 
returns are updated every year, no separate costing is possible to be attributed at this 
point of time. Therefore, no separate costs and so financial allocation for effecting the 
changes would be warranted at this point of time.  
                                                        








One may argue that that the tax implication from the French DST is too small to 
warrant a national response. However, the stakes are of a magnitude larger than $500 
million that France expects to collect in the first year. It sets a precedent for other 
countries, especially in Europe that are at various stages of considering a similar tax. 
Non-response or a less vigorous response from the United States would only 
encourage many other countries to follow suit. Absence of timely response from the 
United States would also take the urgency away from the multilateral negotiations 
presently under progress with the Inclusive Framework of the OECD.  
The invocation of Section 891 of the tax code retains the decision-making 
with regards to the response solely in the hands of the United States. It also serves as 
a ready template for action by the government to embark on a swift action as and 
when any country seeks to target US companies unfairly.  The basis for arriving at a 
finding required in the current case is already available in the form of investigation by 
the USTR.  
The provisions of Section 891 of the Tax code have been brought into the 
code in 1934 as Section 103 of the 1934 Act. It is interesting to note that this 
provision was enacted to counter the then French government’s efforts to unduly tax 
the dividend declared by the US companies to it French subsidiaries and also taking 
the global income of the American Companies for deciding upon the quantum of 
taxation. It was only after this provision was inserted into the Act that French 




taxation in 193426 . Thus, there is historical evidence of the effectiveness of this 
provision that too in the case of France itself.   
However, since then, even though invoking these provisions has been a 
subject matter of deliberation on many an occasion, they have never been invoked. 
The effectiveness of a financial disincentive is well evidenced by the reaction of the 
French government to the threat of retaliatory tariffs pursuant to Section 301 
investigation, recently concluded in December 2019 by the USTR27. Based on the 
findings of the investigation, the United States called for public hearings to decide 
upon the nature of retaliatory tariffs. Faced with impending tariffs on its exports to 
United States, France deferred the collection of the DST due in April and October of 
this year to December 2020.  The goal of the present proposal is to put in place a 
permanent reason for France to withdraw its discriminatory provisions against US 
companies’ altogether and also serve a deterrence to other countries from following 
the France model. Invoking section 891 provisions proved to be an effective 
mechanism even at the time of its insertion to the Code.  
The Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) an independent 
nonprofit, nonpartisan research organization, in its recent research article titled “How 
Congress Can Help Overturn the French Digital Tax” proposed that the US Congress 
pass legislation invoking the provisions of Section 891 to provisionally mandate a tax 
on the global revenues of large firms based in France, Italy, and other DST countries, 
when those firms sell goods or services in the US market28. 
                                                        




27 Section 301 Investigation Report on France’s Digital Services Tax: 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Report_On_France%27s_Digital_Services_Tax.pdf 
 
28 Peterson Institute for International Economics, Gary Clyde Hufbauer, How Congress Can Help 




The experience with France during the events leading to insertion of Section 
103(now 891) in 1934 as explained in the earlier paragraphs, coupled with the current 
response of the French government to the threat of retaliatory tariffs indicate that the 
proposed action would serve as clear and substantive remedy for the situation that 
may emerge, if the France finally decide to impose these discriminatory taxes. It 
would also spell out a clear and present danger for all other countries that intend to go 
down this path of unilateral discriminatory taxation of digital services. It would thus 
be fully successful in achieving its goal. 
Challenges for the proposal: 
This proposal is likely to face challenges on three counts: 
• ‘Last in time’ Rule of for the purpose of interpretation of Section 891 
with reference to tax treaties. 
• Violation of the national treatment commitments under the DTAA29 
• Complaint before WTO. 
The last in time rule is a legal principle, which resolves questions of 
supremacy between a treaty and a conflicting act of Congress. When a self-executing 
treaty and a federal statute relate to the same subject, courts will always attempt to 
construe them so as to give effect to both, if that can be done without violating the 
language of either. However, if the two are inconsistent, the one that was entered later 
in date will control over the other30. Applying this rule, there is scope for one to argue 
that because all the tax treaties have been executed well after 1934 (when section 891 




29 A Constructive U.S. Counter to EU State Aid Cases: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2670&context=facpub 
 






was inserted in the code), the tax treaty providing for non-discrimination and national 
treatment of the citizens and concerns of each other would prevail over the provisions 
of section 891.  This argument, while having some force, has a strong counter 
argument in the fact that this is a temporary arrangement mandated by statute 
specifically aimed at countering the discrimination being meted out to US citizens and 
concerns that violate the same principles equally31.  
Most of the Double Tax Avoidance Agreements (DTAA) that US have entered 
into is based on the US model of the DTAA. Binding arbitration is a standard part of 
this model (Article 25 of the Model agreement)32. So, there is also a possibility that 
the other country government, be it France or any other country (ex. Belgium, 
Canada, Germany etc.) that has arbitration clause in its DTAA with US, may seek 
arbitration33. 
However, both legal challenge and arbitration are time staking propositions. 
By the time these proceedings reach a conclusion, the day-to-day implications of the 
proposed change would be causing sufficient impact to encourage the erring country 
to withdraw these discriminatory changes to law.  
As regards the complaint before WTO is concerned, in the last 25 years of its 
existence the Dispute Settlement Board of WTO had only heard 10% of its cases on 
tax matters34. It is to further note that WTO essentially examines the disputes related 
                                                        
31 How Congress Can Help Overturn the French Digital Tax: https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-
economic-issues-watch/how-congress-can-help-overturn-french-digital-tax 
 













to trade and not tax. There is therefore a possibility that it may be denied from 
admission itself.  However, there exists a slim chance that the WTO may find it to be 
a matter that has indirect impact on trade and admit it for examination. That situation 
would be a redundant contemplation as the decision of France, as and when it starts 
collecting the discriminatory taxes is a fit case of filing of dispute before WTO and so 
would precede the application of the Section 891 by United States. Lastly, the 
decision of the WTO is appealable and in any case, its effectiveness would be 
dependent on the respective countries accepting it and implementing it.  
There is also a possibility that France may raise concerns on the grounds of 
fairness and equity towards the French companies and citizens. However, since the 
measure is in retaliation to the iniquitous and unfair action by France towards US 
companies by way of levy of DST, that is inevitable. 
The authority to administer an executive order must flow from the constitution 
itself or from the mandate granted by the United State Congress to pass such orders35. 
The present proposal deriving its authority from Section 891 of the tax code satisfies 
the earlier requirement. 
As mentioned in the proposal, the implementation of the proposed order 
would only require a change in status and tax rate columns of Form 1120-F and the 
processing software to enable systems automatically calculating taxes for the defined 
category of taxpayers at different rates. It is thus an exercise that requires minimal 
additional resources in terms of manpower and time for implementation. It is thus 
                                                                                                                                                              
Policymakers, IMF Fiscal Aff. Dep’t (Mar. 2016), (“Since 1995, taxation has been the cause of over 40 
of the 500disputes . . . submitted to the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body . . .”). 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/tnm/2016/tnm1602.pdf  
 







administratively and technically feasible. The financial cost for the implementation of 
the proposal is also minimal with no requirement of earmarking any resources 
separately. 
As per the latest statistics (2016) published by the IRS, there are 120,719 
Foreign Controlled Domestic Corporations (Corporation’s with greater than 50% of 
stock held by a single foreign person)[FCDC] in United State, and they have together 
paid $53,941 million in taxes in tax year 201636. Of these companies, 3322 belong to 
France. They paid $3459 million as taxes in the year 201637.   Their total receipts 
from US markets in 2016 have been $306,280 million38.  The Executive Order, if 
passed, in case of French FCDC’s alone, would yield tax revenues far more than that 
extracted from US companies by France.   They simultaneously would render all 
these corporations uncompetitive in their respective markets. Most of these 
corporations are big corporations in France itself39. The loss of US markets for these 
companies would have a cascading effect on the overall health of these companies 
and thus on the financial health of the French economy. A situation that France and 
for that matter any other country would want to avoid, at any cost. The effectiveness 
of the proposal would this be total and immediate. It is thus an efficient mechanism 
producing maximum effect. 
 
                                                        
36 SOI Tax Stats - Foreign-Controlled Domestic Corporations- Table under classification-Country of 














The key stakeholders for the issue on hand are: U.S. digital companies with 
significant business presence in France subjected to the DST; the US Government that 
would lose out its revenue; the French Government that came out with the DST to 
begin with and now needs to take the remedial action; and the French companies and 
citizens that are also US taxpayers.  
A strong and healthy digital industry is imperative for the overall wellbeing of 
the large workforce and their families. Such a large workforce is well distributed 
across the states of USA and are important across the aisle electorally. The digital 
companies that are immediately in the cross hairs of the French DST are 
predominantly American companies like Google, Amazon, and Facebook. The DST is 
basically focused on these American companies as is evidenced by the fact that many 
of the French minsters and officials commonly referred to it as GAFA Tax40. These 
companies have all along been up in arms against the levy of the DST and had 
actively lobbied with French Government4142. They however failed to elicit any 
favorable response.  The impact of the discriminatory DST on their business 
performance has also been submitted to the USTR during its investigation under 
section 301 of the TD Act43. It has been the consistent stand of these US digital 
companies that the United State should respond against the DST44. 
                                                        
40 GAFA tax: a major step towards a fairer and more efficient tax system: 
https://www.gouvernement.fr/en/gafa-tax-a-major-step-towards-a-fairer-and-more-efficient-tax-system 
 
41Tech giants rip new French digital taxes:  
 https://thehill.com/policy/technology/457958-tech-giants-rip-new-french-digital-taxes 
 
42 US tech companies call on France to abandon digital tax plans: 
https://www.ft.com/content/33f7cd26-c28d-11e9-a8e9-296ca66511c9 
 
43 Section 301 Investigation Report on France’s Digital Services Tax: 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Report_On_France%27s_Digital_Services_Tax.pdf 
 





 The US digital companies have also been advocating their cause through 
trade advocacy groups like Computing Technology Industry Association (CompTIA) 
and The Computer & Communications Industry Association (CCIA). Both these 
groups have been vociferous in criticizing the unilateral action(s) by France and 
others like European Union and Britain.  They have also been supportive of the 
actions being taken by United State to discourage these actions454647. Therefore, both 
US digital companies and their employees are likely to welcome the proposal and the 
protection it offers to these companies on foreign lands.  
The United States government that is staring at the possibility of losing out on 
its revenue because of the DST is another important stakeholder of this entire process. 
It has been the consistent stand of the United States to disapprove the unilateral 
measure by France48. Both United States Treasury as well as State Department has 
regularly conveyed to their French counterparts the stand of the United States 
government that France should contribute to the emergence of global consensus 
solution rather than resorting to unilateral discriminatory measures49,50. This proposal 
being in line with the position taken by the State Department as well as United States 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
45 CompTIA Opposes France's Digital Services Tax (DST): https://www.comptia.org/newsroom/press-
releases/2019/09/03/comptia-opposes-france's-digital-services-tax-(dst) 
 












49 Section 301 Investigation Report on France’s Digital Services Tax: 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Report_On_France%27s_Digital_Services_Tax.pdf 
 






Treasury should be a welcome move from government perspective. This is also a 
much-needed mechanism for the government to recoup its revenue losses due to alien 
acts.   
The French government would strongly oppose this proposal. It had refused to 
heed to reason all along the duration of the events leading to the imposition of the 
DST. It is also seen that the action of the French government had the backing of all 
parties of France across spectrum. This is evidenced by the fact that the lawmakers in 
National Assembly voted 88-7 in favor of the bill to while sending it to the Senate for 
approval and political consensus that was achieved in the Senate for the imposition of 
the DST 51,52. France has also warned of a ‘strong response’ in response to the 
impending tariffs by US following the release of investigation report by USTR under 
section 301 of the Trade Act of 197453. This posturing by France derived further 
gravity by the reported solidarity of the European Union against imposition of any 
retaliatory tariffs and endorsing the rights of its member countries to exercise their 
sovereign right to impose digital taxation on companies in a fair way54. Both the 
French government and the European Union are likely to exert pressure and oppose 
the move. 
                                                        



















French companies that do business in the US are another group that is likely to 
oppose the executive order. They have all along been actively encouraging 
negotiations to find a mutually acceptable solution55. With the extra burden that is 
going to be placed on them, it is likely that they would resist the order. At the same 
time, this very group is an effective medium to communicate to the French 
government about the negative consequences of the unilateral DST. Their difficulties 
are a potential way of encouraging France to reconsider the decision to impose DST. 
The overall sentiment on the unilateral measures by France has been generally 
negative as is noticed in the public hearings by the USTR with reference to the 301 
investigations into the DST by France56. The perception that has been conveyed by 
about 40 and odd witnesses that provided evidence or written submissions has been 
that such measures are discriminatory and anti competitive. They were also in favor 
of an appropriate response by United States to stem the tide of unilateral measures by 
other countries and not just France. Effective communication of the move as a 
measure to protect the revenue base of the country and also its employment 
generating companies would add to this support. 
Congress, though having no statutory role in the executive order process, 
could be a necessary player in providing a strong legal support to the order. In theory, 
the US Congress can always pass a law to override the executive order. However, 
legislators in both parties in the Senate and House of Representatives have been 
categorical in condemning the unilateral action by France and expressing concern 
                                                        










over its adverse impact on US57. They have also called for immediate retaliatory 
action against France if it proceeds to collect the tax from US companies58. It is 
therefore likely that the Congress would support the executive order. In fact, it would 
be a worthwhile idea to explore the possibility of the passage of an affirming statute 
by the US congress to reauthorize the President to invoke the Section 891 provisions 
for protecting US industry from discriminatory treatment. This would provide 
protection to the Executive Order from the legal scrutiny as to its validity (as 
mentioned in the policy analysis). 
Several options have been put forward by different stakeholders as the possible 
way(s) for US to respond to the French action59. They are as below: 
1. Expedite the arrival of a consensus based solution through the OECD;  
2. Filing of complaint with WTO;  
3. Imposition of retaliatory tariffs;  
4. Invoking provisions of Section 891 of the U.S. tax code; 
Of these, invoking Section 891 is the best option. Attempting to find a consensus 
solution through the OECD creates an uncertain future for several of the US 
taxpayers. The retaliatory tariff option exposes US exports to France to similar 
response and thus opens up a new area of pain and does not immediately address the 
issue. It would also have an adverse effect on the US businesses and customers that 
are dependent on French imports. The WTO dispute path is a long process with no 
                                                        













certain outcome, while the US companies continue to be subjected to unfair 
discriminatory tax treatment. In case of almost all these paths, the outcome is 
contingent upon the decisions of others while the impact is solely on US companies 
and thus US revenue.  
The invocation of Section 891 of the tax code, on the other hand, retains the 
decision-making authority in the hands of the United States. It also serves as a ready 
template for action by the government when any country seeks to target US 
companies unfairly.  The basis is already available in the form of investigation by the 
USTR.  There are no provisions similar to section 891 in French Tax Code. This 
approach would therefore avoid immediate adverse effect on the US businesses. 
The proposed executive order would be a perfect showpiece to the policy of 
the Government that puts America first while also acknowledging its role in the 
world. It exemplifies the determination of the Government to take tough decisions for 
the greater interests of the Nation. This would resonate well with the large section of 
the Republican voter base. This is the key political benefit of this decision. The 
proposed policy would also ring fence the American MNCs not just from digital 
economy but in all other sectors also. This would virtually portray a sovereign 
backing to the industry and would be huge fillip to the confidence of the industry.  
The industry would therefore welcome the proposal emphatically. This is the primary 
benefit of the proposed executive order. On the international level the continued threat 
of retaliation by US would encourage all the countries presently engaged in protracted 
negotiation under the Inclusive Frame Work of the OECD to quickly arrive at a global 
consensus solution for tax challenges to the digital economy.  
The flip side would be subdued activity by the French Industries in US as well 




largest investor in the US, according to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA).60. The executive order would have a dampening effect on these flows. The 
Foreign (French) domestic corporations pay taxes to the tune of $3459 million (2018) 
to the US treasury.  The executive order would increase the rates and thus the gross 
collections from these companies. However, the subdued economic activity would 
blunt the growth.  
One of the criticisms to the Digital Service Tax has been that it violates the 
international principles of trade and tariffs as agreed at World Trade Organization 
(WTO) namely- bound duties, most favored nation (MFN) duties, and non-
discriminatory national treatment61. The proposed executive order is also vulnerable 
to such allegations. However, without a forceful response, US tech firms, their 
shareholders, and the US Treasury all would lose out at the expense of foreign 
countries62. This would be a necessary trade off inherent in the order. 
Recommendation 
A response to the unilateral imposition of DST is necessary to not just put France on 
notice but also send out a message to all countries that are considering similar 
legislation. It would also be necessary to ensure that the US taxpayers and US 
Treasury do not lose out because of unfair tax practices of other countries.  
                                                        















Issuing an executive order to invoke the provisions of section 891 is a 
sufficiently forceful and effective response to the French DST. Compared to the 
alternatives of raising a dispute with WTO or imposing retaliatory tariffs, this path 
would have faster impact with lesser potential for retaliation both legally as well as 
under arbitration mechanism under the existing treaties. It also has a positive impact 
on the pace of discussions at OECD for arriving at a global consensus.  
It is easy to issue and also implement. US Treasury can be delegated the 
responsibility of administering the order through US IRS. With minor changes to tax 
returns, the IRS would be in a position to implement the decision at low costs. The 
order would be up for review when there is any change in the French position with 
regards to DST. Upon a determination by US Treasury of cessation of the 
discriminatory treatment, the order can be rescinded. The order would raise the stakes 
for France in proceeding with the DST. Until the time France amends the ways, it 
would also recoup the losses to US treasury. It is thus a relatively simple yet effective 
response.  
The one likely problem I find with the proposal is the legal challenge to it on 
the basis that the section 891 is old and the tax treaty with France is new. But I do not 
think that this challenge would be a difficult one to defend. The provisions of Section 
891 empower the President to invoke temporary measures to respond to an unfair 
situation. It in no way fundamentally alters the equal treatment envisaged in the 
treaties in a recurring manner. It should therefore succeed in judicial scrutiny. Further, 
in case such situation is likely to arise, the bipartisan support expressed for a strong 
response to the French action could be utilized to enact an affirming statute by 




I also think that the order would resonate well with the consistent stand of the 
administration in putting America first in its actions. It would reaffirm the 
determination of the President to take tough actions in all situations that threaten 
Americans or American interests. As the step is directly related to protecting the US 
companies and the jobs that they generate by ensuring their profitability, the move 
would have a positive impact on the companies as well as their large employee base. 
Given the bipartisan concern expressed against the unilateral actions by France and 
other countries, the issuance of executive order would also go down well with the US 
congress too.  
Given the urgency to respond and the political considerations surrounding the 
action proposed, I recommend you to issue an executive order to invoke the 
provisions of the section 891 of the Tax Code-26 against countries that subject United 
States citizens or their companies to discriminatory taxes and subject the companies 
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